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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION: 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over the final 
agency action in this case pursuant to Utah Code Annotated sections 
78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1990) (Court of Appeals Jurisdiction), 63-46b-
16 (1989) (Administrative Procedures Act - Judicial Review - Formal 
Adjudicative Proceedings), and 61-1-23 (Supp. 1990) (Utah Uniform 
Securities Act - Review of Orders). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
The Respondents1 believe that the Statement of the Issues 
contained in the Brief of Petitioners (hereinafter "Petitioners' 
Brief") is impermissibly vague2 and contains erroneous standards 
of review. The Respondents therefore offer the following statement 
of the issues and the standards of review: 
Issue I: Based upon the record as a whole, was there 
*The Division of Securities (hereinafter the "DivisionM) and 
the Department of Commerce (hereinafter the "Department of 
Commerce") of the State of Utah (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as the "Respondents"). 
2Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Administrative Procedure 
does not specify any requirements for the statement of the issues, 
but it stands to reason that the issues should be at least as well 
defined in the brief as they are in the docketing statement. Rule 
9(c)(5) states, with regard to docketing statements, that 
"[gjeneral conclusions . . . are not acceptable," yet the Statement 
of Issues contained in the Petitioners' Brief consists of nothing 
but general conclusions. See, Petitioners' Brief at 1-3. 
1 
substantial evidence to support the Division's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law? 
Standard of review: Agency determinations of fact are only 
overturned if, after marshalling all of the evidence supporting the 
findings, the party challenging the findings can establish that the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence, which is such 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion. Grace Drilling v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). This court 
should not substitute its judgment as between two reasonably 
conflicting views, but rather should uphold the agency's findings. 
Id. An agency's conclusions of law concern the application of 
findings of fact to the law, and are therefore mixed questions of 
fact and law, which should not be disturbed on appeal unless the 
agency's "determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App. 1989). 
Issue II: Is there an unconstitutional conflict between the 
Divisions' enforcement of its U.S.A. Medical Stop Trading Order and 
the Johnson's obligations under NASD3 rules? 
Standard of review: This is a mixed question of law and fact, 
requiring a factual determination of the Johnsons' situation and 
how that situation is affected by Utah law and NASD rules. Due to 
the technical nature of the question, this court should uphold the 
3The National Association of Securities Dealers, a self-
regulating organization that governs over the counter stock 
brokerages. It is monitored by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC"). 
2 
agency's position if that position is reasonable and rational. 
Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 767 
P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988) ("Issues of mixed law and fact are often 
illuminated by an agency's expertise, and special technical 
knowledge may be of particular help in determining whether the 
facts fall within the meaning of statutory terms.") See also, Vali 
Convalescent and Care Institutions v. Division of Health Care 
Financing, 797 P.2d 438, 443 (Utah App. 1990) ("For 'ultimate 
facts,' mixed questions of law and fact, interpretations of 
'special law' or the agency's own regulations, and a host of other 
matters between the 'pure fact' and 'general law' extremes, we 
apply an 'intermediate standard,' according the agency decision 
some deference and affirming the disposition if it is reasonable 
and rational"); Pro-Benefit Staffing, 775 P.2d at 442 ("reasonable 
and rational" standard applies to mixed questions of law and fact 
under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act). 
Issue III: Did the Respondents err procedurally with regard 
to the Petitioners'(hereinafter referred to collectively as the 
"Johnsons"M many motions? 
Standard of review: The narrow question of whether the agency 
erred procedurally is a straight question of law, and is governed 
by the correction-of-error standard. In resolving this issue, 
however, the Court will have to review a number of conclusions of 
4T?here is often little reason to distinguish between the two 
Petitioners for purposes of this brief, hence the term "Johnsons" 
is used to refer to both Petitioners. Where reference to a 
specific Petitioner is necessary, Marlen Vernon Johnson is referred 
to as "Marlen Johnson," while Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. is 
referred to as "Johnson-Bowles." 
3 
law and other mixed questions of law and fact, which are correctly 
reviewed under the "reasonable and rational" standard. Hurley. 767 
P.2d at 527. See also, Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions. 
797 P.2d at 443; Pro-Benefit Staffing, 775 P.2d at 442. 
Issue IV: Was the Division's U.S.A. Medical Stop Trading 
Order valid at the time when the Johnsons purchased U.S.A. Medical 
stock? 
Standard of review: This is a mixed question of law and fact, 
requiring a factual determination of status of the Stop Trading 
Order and the application of federal laws to the state. Due to the 
technical nature of the question, this court should uphold the 
agency's position if that position is reasonable and rational. 
Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527. See also, Vali Convalescent and Care 
Institutions, 797 P.2d at 443; Pro-Benefit Staffing, 775 P.2d at 
442. 
Issue V. Was an Order that suspended the Johnsons' 
registration with the Division for one year and placed the 
Johnsons' on probation for two years thereafter unreasonable in 
light of the severity and willful nature of the Johnsons' conduct? 
Standard of review: This is an issue of agency discretion, 
and this court should limit its review to the question of abuse of 
discretion. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(h)(i) (1989). 
LIST OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES. 
REGULATIONS AND RULES: 
For the sake of consistency, all constitutional provisions, 
4 
statutes, ordinances, regulations, rules and materials from NASD or 
NASAA5 have been reproduced as Exhibit MAM in the addendum to this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
The Nature of the Case: 
This is a case where Johnson-Bowles, a securities broker-
dealer, and Marlen Johnson, a securities agent, encouraged the 
Division of Securities to place a Stop Trading Order on the stock 
of IKS.A. Medical, and then knowingly violated, and helped others 
to violate, that Stop Trading Order by purchasing U.S.A. Medical 
stock from Utah residents for over $506,000 less than the Johnsons 
believed the stock would have cost before the Stop Trading Order 
made sales of the securities illegal. Because the Johnsons' acts 
of knowingly violating, and helping others to violate, the Stop 
Trading Order constituted dishonest and unethical practices in the 
securities business, the Division, after a complete formal 
administrative procedure, suspended the Johnsons' licenses for one 
year and placed the Johnsons on an additional two years probation. 
The Facts of the Case: 
5The North American Securities Administrator's Association, an 
organization comprised of securities regulators at the state level 
(including people from the Utah Division of Securities). 
5 
The Respondents believe that the Petitioners have conveniently 
ignored a number of key facts, including admissions by the 
Petitioners and findings by Federal Judge J. Thomas Greene, that 
influenced the Division's decision in this matter. Therefore, the 
Respondents will set forth a complete set of facts that they deem 
relevant to this case: 
1. At all times relevant to this case, Johnson-Bowles was 
registered with the Division as a broker-dealer, and Marlen Johnson 
was registered as an agent. (Stipulation of Facts for Purposes of 
Hearing, R.1154-1158, I 1 at R.1154 (hereinafter "Stipulation of 
Facts"); Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order In re: 
Johnson-Bowles and Marlen Johnson, R.1129-1142, I 1 at R.1129-1130 
(hereinafter "Findings, Conclusions and Order")). 
2. As of January 22, 1989, Johnson-Bowles was "short6" 
exactly 53,500 shares of U.S.A. Medical stock. (Stipulation of 
Facts, I 2 at R.1155; Findings, Conclusions, and Order, I 2 at 
R.1130.) 
3. Of the 53,500 shares, 38,500 shares were deliberately 
purchased "short" by Johnson-Bowles, with the remaining 15,000 
shares representing a sell order placed by a customer through 
Johnson-Bowles but not covered by the customer. (Complaint for 
Securities Fraud and Declaratory Relief in the case of Johnson-
Bowles Company v. U.S.A. Medical Corporation, et al., #89-C-157-G 
6Being "short" means that Johnson-Bowles had been paid by 
other people for stock that it had not delivered. In order to 
cover the "short" position, Johnson-Bowles would have to buy an 
equal amount of stock and deliver it to the parties that had 
already paid Johnson-Bowles. 
6 
(D. Utah Feb. 16, 1989) (hereinafter "Johnsons' Federal ComplaintM 
and "Johnsons' Federal Lawsuit"), at 9.7) 
4. On January 23, 1989, U.S.A. Medical stock underwent a 10 
for 1 forward split8, and thereafter the price per share increased 
approximately tenfold, to approximately $1.00 per share of post-
split stock. (Stipulation of Facts, II 3-4 at R.1155; Findings, 
Conclusions and Order, I 2 at R.1130)). 
5. At a price of approximately $1.00 per share, the Johnsons 
would have had to pay approximately $535,000 to purchase enough 
stock to clear their short position. 
6. On or about February 6, 1989, Otra Clearing House, one of 
the parties to whom Johnson-Bowles owed stock, informed the 
Johnsons that it had "bought-in"9 the 150,000 shares Johnson-Bowles 
owed it, at a price of 10£ per share. On February 15, 1989, the 
Johnsons wrote a letter to Otra Clearing House that said "Johnson-
Bowles Company, Inc., considers U.S.A. Medical Corp., common stock 
7Johnsons' Federal Complaint, and a complete transcript of the 
preliminary injunction hearing in that case, were entered as 
exhibits in the instant administrative hearing, see Reporter's 
Transcript of Proceedings Before the Securities Division In Re 
Johnson-Bowles and Marlen Johnson (July 16, 1990) (hereinafter 
"Hearing Transcript"), R.860-1111, at R.861, were relied upon by 
the Division in its decision making process, and are a part of the 
record in this case, although not separately numbered (the 
documents are in a manila file folder, along with other documents 
that were entered into evidence at the Division's Hearing). 
leaning that each old share of U.S.A. Medical was replaced by 
10 new shares of post-split stock. After the split, Johnson-Bowles 
was short 535,000 shares of new U.S.A. Medical stock. 
9,,Buying-in" is a normal practice in the securities industry. 
When party "A" fails to deliver stock that it owes to party "B" 
within a given period of time, then party "B" may "buy-in" the 
stock by purchasing it from some other source "CM and charging 
party "A" the purchase price. 
7 
to be unregistered securities. We choose not to engage or 
participate in an unlawful distribution of unregistered 
securities." (Letter of 15 February 1989, Hearing Before the 
Securities Division of the Department of Commerce of the State of 
Utah (hereinafter "Hearing") Exhibit P-210; Findings, Conclusions, 
and Order, M 3-4 at R.1130.) 
7. The next day, on February 16, 1989, Johnson-Bowles filed 
the Johnsons' Federal Lawsuit. See, Johnson-Bowles Company v. 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation, et al., #89-C-157-G (D. Utah Feb. 16, 
1989). In the Complaint, Johnson-Bowles alleges that it "believes 
and asserts that there is no exemption for any U.S.A. Medical 
shares trading in interstate commerce," that it "is fearful of 
honoring its commitments with the numerous Broker-Dealer 
Defendants, including either taking delivery of stock or otherwise 
delivering such itself, as it does not want to aid and abet, or 
otherwise participate or engage in an unlawful distribution of 
unregistered securities, namely, the securities of U.S.A. Medical," 
and that "there is no exemption for the shares of U.S.A. Medical 
trading in interstate commerce." (Johnsons' Federal Complaint, at 
13, 13, and 26 respectively; Findings, Conclusions and Order, I 5 
at R.1131.) 
8. On February 17, 1989, United States District Court Judge 
J. Thomas Greene granted Johnson-Bowles motion for a temporary 
restraining order preventing Midwest Clearing from buying-in U.S.A. 
10This document, like the Johnsons' Federal Lawsuit documents 
and all of the other documents that were introduced into evidence 
at the Hearing, is part of the record in this case, is in the 
manila file folder, and has not been separately paginated. 
8 
Medical stock on Johnson-Bowies' account. (Stipulation of Facts, 
1 6 at R.1155; Findings, Conclusions and Order, I 6 at R.1131.) 
9. Judge Greene held a preliminary injunction hearing on 
February 27 and 28 concerning Johnson-Bowles' motion to enjoin 
further buy-ins against it. At that hearing, a number of witnesses 
testified for Johnson-Bowles, including Marlen Johnson. At the 
conclusion of the hearing Judge Greene ruled from the bench against 
Johnson-Bowles and subsequently entered, on March 1, 1989, a 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, which read in 
part, as follows:11 
2. The Court finds that the stock of U.S.A. Medical 
was unlawfully issued, has never been registered with any 
proper regulatory authority, is not exempt from such 
requisite registration and has been and is continuing to 
be traded illegally. 
3. The stock of U.S.A. Medical has been and 
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and 
device to manipulate and artificially inflate the price 
of that stock in violation of the securities laws. 
4. The Court finds, however, that the plaintiff, 
Johnson-Bowles, knew or should have known about the 
alleged irregularities as to non-registration, non-exempt 
status and illegal trading in the stock after it became 
a market maker, and is charged with knowledge of these 
irregularities. 
5. The Court finds that relative burden between 
Johnson-Bowles and other parties as well as damage to the 
public interest has not been shown by a preponderance of 
the evidence and that there is a failure of burden of 
proof to establish those elements. 
(Judge Greene's Findings of Fact, etc., Hearing Exhibit R-3, at 6; 
Findings, Conclusions and Order, I 6 at 1131-1132.) 
10. Judge Greene did not rule on the issue of whether 
nThe order was apparently prepared from a transcript of Judge 
Green's oral ruling; the two are almost identical. See, Johnsons' 
Federal Lawsuit transcript at 2-263 through 2-264. 
9 
Johnson-Bowles was required to buy-in U.S.A. Medical stock, though 
he did rule that the stock lacked either registration or exemption 
and was being traded illegally. Judge Greene stayed the case as to 
all NASD members, and he ordered that all NASD members submit their 
claims to arbitration. (Judge Greene's Findings of Fact, etc., 
Hearing Exhibit R-3, at 7.) 
11. On the same day that Judge Greene entered his Order, the 
Division of Securities entered its Summary Order Denying 
Availability of Exemptions from Registration (hereinafter the 
"Temporary Stop Trading Order"). (Temporary Stop Trading Order, 
R.290-294; Stipulation of Facts, J 9 at 1156; Findings, Conclusions 
and Order, I 7 at 1132.) That Order was made final by the 
Division's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default Order 
of March 27, 1989 (hereinafter the "Permanent Stop Trading Order"). 
(Permanent Stop Trading Order, R.1164-1168; Stipulation of Facts, 
I 9 at R.1156; Findings, Conclusions and Order, f 9 at R.1133.) 
(Because the two operate together, with no gap in coverage, the 
Temporary and Permanent Stop Trading Orders are collectively 
referred to herein as the "Stop Trading Order.") The Stop Trading 
Order denied U.S.A. Medical stock the benefit of any exemptions 
from Utah stock registration requirements, thereby making trading 
in the stock illegal in Utah.12 The Johnsons had actual knowledge 
of both the Stop Trading Order and the Default Order at the time of 
issuance. (Stipulation of Facts, f 11 at R.1156; Findings, 
12This was the conclusion of law reached by the Securities 
Advisory Board. See, Findings, Conclusions and Order, at 8-9, 
R.1136-1137. 
10 
Conclusions and Order, f 9 at 1133.) 
12. On March 1, 1989, Otra Clearing House completed its buy-
in of 150,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical stock, but at a price of 70* 
per share. (Letter of Marlen Johnson to Ken Schaeffer of NASD, 
Hearing Exhibit P-l, at 4; Findings, Conclusions and Order, I 7 at 
R*1132.) There is nothing in the record that clearly establishes 
whether Otra Clearing House made its buy-in before the Division 
issued its Stop Trading Order (or before Otra became aware of the 
Order). 
13. On March 6, 1989, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission issued a ten day Order of Suspension of 
Trading, which stopped trading in U.S.A. Medical stock nationwide. 
That order, by its terms, expired at 11:59 p.m. EST on March 15, 
1989. (SEC Order of Suspension of Trading, R.1169; Stipulation of 
Facts, f 10 at R.1156; Findings, Conclusions and Order, I 8 at 
R.1132.) 
14. During the month of March, 1989,13 at a time when the 
Johnsons were aware of the U.S.A. Medical Stop Trading Order, the 
Johnsons purchased 397,900 shares of U.S.A. Medical stock from six 
Utah Residents and one New York resident. (Stipulation of Facts, 
If 12-14, 16, at R.1156-1157; Findings, Conclusions and Order, 1 
10, R.1133.) The Johnsons engaged in this transaction even though 
l30r perhaps mid-April. Although the parties stipulated to the 
March date, R.1156, on the witness stand Marlen Johnson was unable 
to pinpoint a date, and had to admit that the transactions may not 
have closed until mid-April, based on when Johnson-Bowles paid for 
the stock. Hearing Transcript at 171-174. The Respondents argued 
at the hearing, and argue now, that the Johnsons waited long enough 
for the Division's Stop Trading Order to have the effect of 
severely depressing prices before illegally purchasing the stock. 
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they had been advised by legal counsel that it was illegal for them 
to do so. (Hearing Transcript, at 151-153; Johnsons' Federal 
Lawsuit Transcript, at 2-219 through 2-220.) Further, Marlen 
Johnson later admitted to an employee of the Division that he knew 
at the time he made them that the purchases would be in 
contravention of the Stop Trading Order. (Hearing Transcript, at 
R.890, R.893.) 
15. The difference in price between the price at which the 
Johnsons sold the stock short and the price at which they illegally 
purchased the stock yielded the Johnsons a net profit of $6,538. 
(Hearing Transcript, at R.1045; Findings, Conclusions and Order, I 
13 at R.1134-1135.) According to the Johnsons' own accountant, if 
the stock had been bought-in at the pre-Stop Trading Order price of 
70£ per share, the Johnsons would have lost approximately $500,000. 
(Hearing Transcript, at R.1139.) Thus, the Johnsons benefitted by 
approximately $506,538 as a result of illegally purchasing shares 
in violation of the Stop Trading Order. 
16. On March 21, 1989, Marlen Johnson, on behalf of Johnson-
Bowles, wrote a letter to Ken Schaeffer of the National Association 
of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), in which he reiterated Judge 
Greene's findings "that the stock in U.S.A. Medical was unlawfully 
issued, has never been registered with any proper regulatory 
authority, is not exempt from such requisite registration and has 
been and is continuing to be traded illegally." (Letter of March 
21, 1989, Hearing Exhibit P-l, at 1.) The Johnsons' letter went on 
to complain about the March 1st Otra buy-in, and explained the 
Johnsons' position as to the legality of trading in U.S.A. Medical 
12 
stocks 
It is Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.fs position that 
these buy-ins were illegal. First, shares of stock in 
U.S.A. Medical Corp. were unlawfully issued, were never 
lawfully registered and do not qualify for any valid 
exemption under federal or state law. As such, any 
trading of or transaction involving U.S.A. Medical stock 
has been, would have been and is unlawful under Section 
5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 USC § 77e, and 
Section 10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
USC S 78j(b). 
Second, all open trades or outstanding contracts for 
the purchase or sale of shares of stock in U.S.A. Medical 
Corp. are illegal contracts and therefore unenforceable. 
The enforcement or performance of any and all such open 
trades or contracts would constitute and serve to 
complete illegal trades and unenforceable contracts. 
This would violate securities laws. 
(Hearing Exhibit P-l, at 4; Findings, Conclusions and Order, 5 8 at 
R.1132-1133.) 
The Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
The Division instigated this action by filing two Notices of 
Agency Action with attached petitions, one against Johnson-Bowles 
(R.280-289) and one against Marlen Johnson (R.263-273). An Amended 
Petition, consolidating and simplifying the actions, was 
subsequently filed (R.161-169.) Thereafter, there were numerous 
motions filed, several of which were cited as grounds for appeal 
and are discussed at length below. A hearing was held on July 16, 
1990, before the Securities Advisory Board (Hearing Transcript, 
R.860-1115). On August 10, 1990, the Securities Advisory Board 
issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
(Findings, Conclusions and Order, R.1129-1142.) That order 
suspended the Johnsons' registration for one year and placed them 
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on an additional two years of probation. After an agency review, 
the Director of the Department of Commerce, David Buhler, issued an 
Order on Review on October 29, 1990, which affirmed the Division's 
Order. (Order on Review, R.830-842.) This appeal follows. 
A SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT: 
This is a simple license suspension case masquerading as a 
complex securities law case. The Division of Securities lawfully 
issued an order stopping all Utah trading in the stock of U.S.A. 
Medical Corporation. Johnson-Bowles, a Utah broker-dealer, and 
Marlen Johnson, a Utah registered agent, violated the Stop Trading 
Order by purchasing U.S.A. Medical stock from six Utah sellers. 
That direct, willful violation of the Division's order by the 
Johnsons constituted dishonest and unethical conduct, for which the 
Johnsons were properly suspended, following a lawful and correct 
administrative proceeding. Despite the Johnsons' assertions to the 
contrary, the Division's enforcement of its stop trading order was 
not in conflict with NASD rules, and the Johnsons could have abided 
by the Division's order without risking NASD sanctions for failure 
to purchase stock (in part because there are no sanctions for 
failing to purchase stock). 
THE ARGUMENT; 
Point I: Based Upon the Record as a Whole, There is More than 
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Substantial Evidence to Support the Division's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
The Findings of Fact are supported by substantial evidence. 
As noted in the issues and standards of review section of this 
brief, the Johnsons have the burden in this case to nmarshall all 
of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the 
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory 
evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." 
Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68 (emphasis in original). Instead of 
meeting their burden, the Johnsons carefully selected the facts 
that they felt supported their case, and conveniently neglected to 
marshall many of the key facts relied upon by, and often even 
quoted in, the Findings of Fact. For example, the Petitioners' 
Brief fails to mention many of the admissions that the Johnsons 
made that they knew trading in U.S.A. Medical stock was illegal. 
Because the Johnsons failed to marshall all of the evidence, this 
Court should ignore their claims that the Findings of Fact are 
flawed. 
If the Johnsons had marshalled all of the evidence, it would 
be clear that all of the key Findings of Fact are supported by 
sufficient evidence. The following table references each important 
Finding of Fact and shows some of the evidence that supports each 
Finding:14 
14This list is not meant to be exclusive. A more thorough 
listing of the evidence can be found in the Facts of this Case 
section of the brief. The Stipulation of Facts can be found at 
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Finding # 
1 
1 2 1 3 1 4 
5 
1 6 
7 
1 8 1 9 1 10 
| 13 
1 ' d 
References to Supporting Evidence | 
Stip. of Facts, f 1 1 
Stip. of Facts, I 2 | 
Stip. of Facts, I 8; Hearing Exhibit P-2 1 
Hearing Exhibit P-4 1 
Johnsons' Federal Complaint, at 13, 26 f 
Stip. of Facts, I 6; Hearing Exhibit R-3, at 6 | 
Stip. of Facts, I 9; Hearing Exhibit P-l, at 4 | 
Stip. of Facts, I 10; Hearing Exhibit P-l, at 4 | 
Stip. of Facts, If 9, 11 I 
Stip. of Facts, II 12-14, 16 1 
Hearing Transcript, R.1045 | 
The foregoing table, and the Facts of the Case section of this 
brief, conclusively show that there was more than substantial 
evidence to support each Finding of Fact. 
The Conclusions of Law are Reasonable and Rational. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in this 
case was entered by the Securities Advisory Board, a body that is 
expert in the area of securities law,15 and approved by the then 
R.1154-1158. Findings of Fact 11, 12, 14, and 15 are not included 
in the table because the Respondents do not believe that they are 
very important for purposes of upholding the Division's Order. 
Respondents assert that there is adequate evidence to support those 
four findings, however, and that the Petitioners, having failed to 
marshall the evidence (or even assert any flaw) with regard to 
those findings should be estopped from challenging them. 
15The Securities Advisory Board is composed of five members: 
Two from the securities brokerage community with at least five 
years experience in securities, one member of the securities 
section of the Utah State Bar, one officer or director of a 
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Director of the Division of Securities, John Baldwin, and then 
affirmed by the Director of the Department of Commerce, David L. 
Buhler. The Conclusions of law require the application of facts to 
the law in the highly specialized area of securities law. As mixed 
questions of fact and law, the Conclusions of Law should be upheld 
unless they are unreasonable. Hurley. 767 P.2d at 527 ("Issues of 
mixed law and fact are often illuminated by an agency's expertise, 
and special technical knowledge may be of particular help in 
determining whether the facts fall within the meaning of statutory 
terms."). 
The Johnsons have failed to show that the Conclusions of Law 
are unreasonable. Indeed, they have failed to directly analyze and 
critique the Conclusions of Law, other than to say that the finding 
of fact on which they are based lack substantial evidence, a point 
which was disposed of above.16 The Court should therefore 
summarily affirm the Conclusions of Law. 
While the Respondents refuse to do the Johnsons' work for them 
corporation affected by Utah securities laws, and one member of the 
public at large. Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-18.5(2) (1989). 
16The Johnson do assert, in cursory style, that the Division 
offered no evidence that the Johnsons' sellers lacked exemption 
from registration. Nonsense. The Stop Trading Order, which denied 
the availability of all transactional exemptions, constitutes prima 
facia evidence that no exemption existed, as did Judge Greene's 
findings. In light of the Stop Trading Order and Judge Greene's 
findings, it was the Johnsons' burden to show what exemption they 
relied upon; needless to say, they have never identified any such 
^exemption. In light of the numerous assertions by the Johnsons 
that no exemption existed, the Johnsons should now be estopped from 
claiming that one did. Indeed, even if an exemption did exist that 
made the trades legal, the Johnsons would still be guilty of 
dishonest and unethical conduct if they traded in stock that, by 
their own repeated admissions, they fully believed was not exempt. 
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by analyzing every statement in the Conclusions of Law against 
every possible attack, there are a few key conclusions that warrant 
the Court's attention. 
The Conclusions of Law begin (after identifying the Johnsons' 
alleged defenses) by reviewing the Division's statutory authority. 
See, Findings, Conclusions and Order, at R.1136. Utah Code 
Annotated section 61-1-6(1) (1989) is quoted for the proposition 
that the Division may suspend the registration of a broker-dealer 
or agent who has "engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in 
the securities business." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6(1)(g) (1989). 
Section 61-1-7 is quoted to show that " [i]t is unlawful for any 
person to offer or sell any security in this state unless it is 
registered under this chapter or the security or transaction is 
exempted under Section 61-1-14." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1989). 
Although the point apparently baffles the Johnsons, common sense 
dictates that willfully purchasing a security that you know cannot 
legally be sold constitutes a dishonest or unethical practice in 
the securities business.17 
17The Johnsons assert that they were found to have "aided and 
abetted" in a legal sense, and then assert that they could not have 
done so. That is not the case. The Johnsons were sanctioned for 
having participated in, and encouraged (by buying the stock) a 
securities transaction that they knew was illegal. 
Even if the Divisions' case rested solely on the "aiding and 
abetting" theory, there is ample support for that theory. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990) states that "[e]very person, acting 
with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who 
directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as 
a party for such conduct." Contrary to the Johnsons' assertions, 
as the following paragraphs of this brief demonstrate, the Stop 
Trading Order did not merely seek to protect the Johnsons (or other 
purchasers) from themselves; the order was entered to protect the 
18 
The Securities Advisory Board then entered a key Conclusion of 
Law with regard to the proper scope of a Stop Trading Order: 
The proper scope and operative effect of the March 
1, 1989 Order entered by the Division was to prohibit any 
trading of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities within 
this state. Since those securities were neither 
registered nor exempt from registration and had been 
traded in a fraudulent scheme designed to manipulate the 
price of those securities, the just-stated order was duly 
entered to protect the public interest. It is specious 
to argue, as [the Johnsons] assert, that the order only 
prohibited the sale of U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities. Given the unlawful issuance of those 
securities and that the subsequent trading of those 
securities was tainted by fraudulent and manipulative 
practices, the proper scope of the March 1, 1989 Order 
must be broadly interpreted and in a manner consistent 
with the purpose for the issuance of that order. 
Findings, Conclusions, and Order, at R.1136-1137. Given the 
expertise of the Securities Advisory Board, including two 
experienced members of the Utah brokerage community, this Court 
should defer to the reasonable and rational conclusion that an 
order denying the effectiveness of exemptions from registration is 
clearly interpreted by the Utah brokerage community as a Stop 
Trading Order that prohibits any trading whatsoever. 
The next key conclusion of law states that the Johnsons 
. . . purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation Securities 
after March 1, 1989 with knowledge that a sale of those 
securities would constitute a violation of the March 1, 
1989 Order. Such conduct clearly constitutes a 
"dishonest or unethical practice" within the meaning of 
Section 61-1-6(1) (g) and provides a sufficient basis upon 
which to enter a disciplinary sanction as to [the 
public.at large and to prohibit any more trades in tainted stock. 
The Johnsons, by willfully encouraging and aiding others to sell 
stock to them in violation of the Stop Trading Order and Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-7 (1989), aided and abetted those violations, and under 
Utah law is liable as a principle. (Willfulness is the mental 
state required for a criminal prosecution under the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-21 (1989).) 
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Johnsons'] registration. 
Findings, Conclusions and Order, at R.1137-1138. This Conclusion 
of Law is again a result of the application of expertise in the 
area of securities law to the facts of this case. It is reasonable 
and rational. If the conduct was not of a type that is viewed as 
clearly and unambiguously dishonest and unethical in the industry, 
it is hard to imagine how two members of the brokerage community 
and a member of the securities section of the Utah Bar could feel 
comfortable signing their names to the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. 
While a number of other Conclusions of law could be similarly 
reference, only one more will be addressed briefly here. The 
Securities Advisory Board found that "the [Johnsons'] dishonest and 
unethical conduct was driven by a desire to realize monetary gain 
and/or avoid financial loss and that [the Johnsons'] willingness to 
engage in trading the securities shifted over time, depending upon 
whatever would promote [the Johnsons'] economic interests.11 
Findings, Conclusions and Order, at R.1139. The Board therefore 
concluded that " [b]y reason of the serious nature of [the 
Johnsons'] misconduct, an appropriately severe sanction should be 
entered." Id., at R.1140. Once again, based upon the facts as set 
forth in the Findings of Fact and in the Facts of the Case portion 
of this brief, there is ample evidence that the Johnsons asserted 
that any trading in U.S.A. Medical was illegal whenever they were 
concerned about high buy-in prices, but gladly purchased the stock 
in defiance of the Divisions' Stop Trading Order when doing so 
would save them some $506,538. 
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Every significant Conclusion of Law is supported by ample 
evidence, and the Conclusions of Law should be affirmed in their 
entirety. 
Point II: The Petitioners Have Failed to Meet Their Burden of 
Establishing that there is an Unconstitutional Conflict between the 
Division*8 Enforcement of its U.S.A. Medical Stop Trading Order and 
the Petitioners' Obligations Under NASD Rules: 
The heart of the Johnsons' appeal in this case is an argument 
that the Divisions' Stop Trading Order, as applied to the Johnsons, 
unconstitutionally conflicts with federal law in the form of NASD 
Rules. This was the basis for the Petitioners' Rule 12(b)(1), Rule 
12(b)(6) and Rule 56 Motions, and most of the points raised in the 
Petitioners' Brief go to this argument, by focusing on various 
alleged constitutional defects.18 
The Johnsons' argument rests on two basic assumptions: First, 
that the Johnsons, under the facts of the case, were required to 
violate the Stop Trading Order in order to fulfill their NASD 
requirements; and second that NASD rules have the force of federal 
law and therefore preempt the Division's Stop Trading Order. If 
the Johnsons fail to establish the validity of either of these 
assumptions, then most of the constitutional arguments raised in 
their brief are inapplicable. 
The Petitioners' Brief cites Article III, section 1 of the 
18Specifically, the following points in the Petitioners' Brief 
are dependent on this argument to the degree that they cannot be 
successfully raised if the argument is invalid: 2(A); 2(B); 2(C); 
2(D); 2(E); 3; 4(A); 4(C); 4(D); 4(F); 4(H); and 4(N). 
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NASD Rules of Fair Practice, and Paragraph 1401 of the NASAA 
Statements of Policy for the proposition that broker-dealers and 
agents are required by both NASD and NASAA to "observe high 
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of 
trade." NASD Manual, (CCH) f 2151 (1990); NASAA Reports, (CCH) f 
1401 (1987).19 The Johnsons assert, without authority, that those 
general standards required that they violate the Divisions' Stop 
Trading Order by purchasing U.S.A. Medical shares from Utah 
residents in order to cover their "short" position. More 
specifically, they contend that they could have been sanctioned by 
NASD, or even expelled from NASD, for failing to cover their 
"short" position by purchasing from Utah sellers. 
The Johnsons have utterly failed to prove that they ran the 
risk of any sanction by NASD if they did not purchase the U.S.A. 
Medical stock. They offered not one single case in which a member 
of NASD has been similarly sanctioned.20 Even the Johnsons' expert 
witness at the administrative hearing, David King, had to admit 
19The Respondents agree that the Johnsons are held to those 
standards; indeed, the Division suspended the Johnsons because 
their dishonest and unethical behavior failed to comply with those 
standards. 
20Indeed, the only evidence in the entire record that the 
Johnsons were faced with NASD sanctions is Marlen Johnson's self-
serving hearsay statement that Ken Schaeffer of NASD told him "that 
we had to honor the contracts under any circumstances, or the NASD 
would take charge and we would be fined." Hearing Transcript at 
93. Even assuming that Marlen Johnson correctly quoted Ken 
Schaef fer, all NASD was requiring was that the Johnsons "honor the 
contracts," which could be done by paying for stock bought-in on 
their behalf. Given the total lack of evidence that the NASD had 
any intention of trying to sanction the Johnsons for abiding by the 
Division's Stop Trading Order, this entire issue should be 
summarily resolved in favor of the Respondents. 
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that he knew of no case where NASD had sanctioned a member for a 
failure to deliver securities. Hearing Transcript, at 213-214. 
There is a self-evident reason for this: Failure to deliver 
a security, by itself, is not sanctionable by NASD.21 To the 
contrary, the NASD Uniform Practice Code contains a lengthy and 
detailed "buy-in" procedure, which is specifically designed to be 
followed in the event that a seller fails to deliver a security. 
NASD Manual (CCH) f 3559, et. seg. (1987). As the Petitioners' 
Brief concedes, "[b]uy-ins are regular occurrences in the 
securities brokerage business when a broker has not made timely 
delivery" of stock to cover a short position. Petitioners' Brief, 
at 12 n.ll. All that the Johnsons had to do was allow buy-ins by 
the parties that they had shorted, and the Johnsons could not have 
been sanctioned by NASD; likewise, they would not have violated the 
Divisions' Stop Trading Order.22 
The Johnsons assert that they could not have allowed the buy-
ins because the price of the buy-ins would have caused them to fall 
21There is another, equally self-evident reason. It is 
preposterous to presume that the NASD would sanction a member for 
failing to purchase stock that could only be purchased illegally. 
For example, if the Johnsons' position is correct, and no state law 
can interfere with their overarching federal obligation to deliver 
stock, and if the Johnsons knew of some stock that could only be 
obtained by violating a probate order, or even by stealing pre-
endorsed stock certificates, then under the Johnsons' reasoning, 
federal law would require that the Johnsons violate the probate 
order or steal the stock. 
22Johnson-Bowles owed the stock to out of state persons and 
entities, who would not have been violating the Stop Trading Order 
if they had purchased from out of state sellers. 
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below minimum capital requirements,23 which in turn would have 
caused the NASD to have put them out of business. This is what the 
Johnsons really mean when they refer to the threat of NASD 
sanctions. The Johnsons' argument is flawed in three respects. 
First, the evidence suggests that the price of the buy-ins 
would not have been excessive. The Johnsons purchased from at 
least one New York resident at an acceptable price, and there is no 
evidence in the record that buy-ins from other out of state 
residents were not possible at similarly favorable prices. See, 
Stipulation of Facts for Purposes of Hearing, at R.1155. 
Second, if buy-ins were made at a price that the Johnsons felt 
was too high, they could have sought NASD arbitration24 as to the 
reasonableness of that price, using the New York purchase to 
establish the proper fair market price. 
Third, and most importantly, even if the buy-in prices would 
have been so high that they would have driven Johnson-Bowles out of 
business, the Johnsons still would not have been entitled to 
violate the Stop Trading Order. The penny stock market is a 
volatile place, and more than one brokerage house has gone out of 
business because it found itself on the losing end of a major price 
23All broker-dealers are required to meet minimum capital 
requirements in order to remain in business. See, 17 CFR 240.15c3-
1 (1990); Utah Admin. Code R177-4-4 (1990). If a broker-dealer 
falls below the allowed minimum, that broker-dealer will generally 
be forced to shut down. 
24Which they were engaged in anyway as a result of Judge 
Green's orders, with regard to the issue of whether they could 
rescind their original short sales. It would not have been 
difficult to have also arbitrated the correctness of the price paid 
for buy-in stock. 
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fluctuation.23 The law does not allow broker-dealers and agents 
to violate Stop Trading Orders merely to avoid economic loss, 
however severe. 
In short, there is no reason to believe that the Johnsons 
risked being sanctioned by NASD if they had refused to violate the 
Stop Trading Order, but had agreed to allow the buy-ins. The 
Johnsons only faced NASD sanctions because of their poor economic 
situation, which was not caused by the Division's order. There is 
no conflict between enforcement of the Division's order and NASD 
rules. 
Finally, even if there were a conflict between the Stop 
Trading Order and the NASD rules, the Johnsons have failed to 
establish that the conflict must be resolved in favor of the NASD 
rules and at the expense of state law.26 The NASD is not an agency 
of the federal government; it is merely a self-regulating industry 
organization that is authorized by federal law and subject to 
monitoring by the SEC. NASD rules are not promulgated by the 
25If the Johnsons' loss was due to fraud or market manipulation 
by persons affiliated with U.S.A. Medical, the Johnsons' proper 
remedy would be to sue those persons, not to violate the Division's 
Stop Trading Order. 
26Section 28 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1924, 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78bb(a), states that M[n]othing in this chapter shall 
affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission . . . of any 
State over any security or person insofar as it does not conflict 
with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations 
thereunder." Thus, no implied preemption or comity argument is 
possible with regard to security laws. Federal law only expressly 
preempts directly conflicting state law; all other state law is 
valid. In this case, at most, the Johnsons are claiming an 
indirect conflict based upon the specific nature of the facts in 
this case. Such an incidental conflict is not sufficient to raise 
a question of federal preemption under 15 U.S.C.A. S 78bb(a). 
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federal government, although the SEC can monitor those rules* The 
Johnsons have failed to cite even one federal case that says that 
NASD rules have the force of federal law for purposes of conflict 
of laws analysis. By contrast, the Divisions' Stop Trading Order 
is specifically authorized by Utah statute. See, Point IV of this 
brief. It is a clear exercise of the state's police power to 
prevent fraud and chaos in the state's penny stock market; the 
state's powers are essentially identical to powers that the SEC has 
at the federal level. Id. The Johnsons have simply failed to show 
that there is a basis for federal pre-emption, even assuming that 
there was a real conflict between the NASD rules and state law. 
Point III: The Respondents did not Err in Denying the Petitioners' 
Many Motions; 
The ALJ's order converting the administrative procedure from 
informal to formal was correct. 
This case began as an informal agency action, as defined by 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act27, on April 27, 1989. On 
May 24, 1989, the Division made a motion to convert the proceeding 
from informal to formal under the Administrative Procedures Act. 
(R.260.) The Johnsons objected to the conversion, (R.251.) and a 
hearing was held on June 5, 1989. (R.242.) The motion was granted 
on July 14, 1989. (R.174.) 
The Johnsons object to the conversion on three grounds: 
27Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-l, et seg. (1989). 
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First, that the Division's own rules designate all adjudicative 
proceedings as informal; second# that the conversion is not in the 
public interest; and third, that conversion unfairly prejudiced the 
Johnsons. 
It is true that Utah Administrative Code Rule R177-46b-6B 
(1990) states that "[a]ll adjudicative proceedings under the Act, 
enumerated in this Rule, are designated as informal adjudicative 
proceedings•" Nothing in that rule, however, prohibits a motion to 
convert to formal proceedings. By contrast, the Administrative 
Procedures Act specifically provides for conversion: 
Any time before a final order is issued in any 
adjudicative proceeding, the presiding officer may 
convert . . . an informal adjudicative proceeding to a 
formal adjudicative proceeding if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in 
the public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not 
unfairly prejudice the rights of any party. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) (1989) (emphasis added). Under the 
express terms of that statute, the Division had a clear right to 
seek conversion before a final order was issued. 
The Divisions' motion was based upon a belief that conversion 
of such a complex matter from an informal to a formal proceeding 
was in the public interest. Administrative Law Judge J. Steven 
Eklund specifically found that: 
Given the relative complexity of securities regulation, 
expertise in the application and interpretation of the 
statutes and rules which govern the securities industry 
could prove to be invaluable to any fact finder charged 
with the responsibility to determine whether certain 
conduct is violative of the governing statutes and rules 
in that regard. In fact, the existence and effectiveness 
of agency adjudicative proceedings is primarily 
predicated upon the exercise of such specialized skills 
by boards and commissions similar to the Securities 
27 
Advisory Board. In light of the proposed agency action 
incident to these proceedings, it is in the public 
interest to conduct these cases on a formal basis. 
(R.173.) Judge Eklund's findings are reasonable and rationalf and 
should not be disturbed by this court.28 
The Johnsons' claim that they were unfairly prejudiced because 
they lost the right to a trial de novo in District Court is without 
foundation. Once again, Judge Eklund's findings are reasonable and 
rational: 
[The Johnsons'] concern with costs which could be 
incurred on appeal and the nature of judicial review from 
any order entered in this forum implies that [the 
Johnsons] believe the outcome of these proceedings is a 
foregone conclusion. Although the division has 
undertaken proceedings which could prompt entry of a 
disciplinary sanction against [the Johnsons], there is no 
basis to conclude that [the Johnsons] will not be 
accorded due process in these proceedings, whether 
conducted on a formal or informal basis. 
(R.173.) Further, because the motion to convert was brought in the 
first month of this adjudicative process, Judge Eklund found that 
the conversion "would not adversely affect the substantial rights 
of either party." Id. 
The law allows conversion of an administrative action from 
informal to formal, and the conversion in this case was in the 
public interest and did not unfairly prejudice the Johnsons. 
Therefore, the ALJ acted correctly in granting the Division's 
motion to convert the proceedings to a formal status. 
28Although most of the issues raise under Point III of this 
brief are subject to the "correction-of-error" standard of review, 
the questions of whether conversion is in the public interest or 
would unfairly prejudice the Johnsons are mixed questions of fact 
and law, and should be subject to the "reasonable and rational" 
standard of review. 
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The ALJ properly denied the Petitioners' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion. 
On July 3, 1989, the Johnsons filed a motion to dismiss due to 
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as referenced by section 63-46b-
1(4)(b) (1989) of the Administrative Procedures Act. (R.239-241.) 
The motion was denied by ALJ Eklund on August 27, 1989, after full 
briefing and oral argument. (R.149-153.) 
The Johnsons have argued, on pages 25-36 of there brief, that 
the motion should have been granted. In support of that argument 
they assert five closely related grounds, all of which go to the 
question of whether the Division can sanction the Johnsons for 
violating the Stop Trading Order in light of the alleged conflict 
between that order and NASD requirements. Point II of this brief 
has already analyzed the substance of Johnsons claims of alleged 
conflict between the Division's order and NASD requirements, and 
has shown that the conflict exists solely in Johnsons' mind.29 
Even assuming every argument in pages 25-36 of the 
Petitioners' Brief were valid, however, they still do not add up to 
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Even if the Johnsons were 
entirely right as to their theory of the case, the Division would 
still have jurisdiction to bring an administrative proceeding.30 
29Judge Eklund did address the substance of the Johnsons' 
claims in his conclusions of law denying the Rule 12(b)(1) motion. 
See, R.150-152. 
30The case of Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates. Inc., 401 F. Supp. 
1137 (D.C.N.Y. 1975), is illustrative. In that case the defendant 
argued that the land deal over which it was being sued did not 
involve a security under federal law and hence there was no subject 
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The Johnsons have moved to dismiss on the basis of a lack of 
jurisdiction, where the allegation is merely one of lack of merit. 
The issue of whether a court or agency has jurisdiction to decide 
a matter and whether the specific claims of the case against a 
defendant have merit are entirely severable and distinct issues. 
See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice Civil 2d Section 1350 (1990). 
This is a license suspension case. Utah Code Annotated 
section 61-1-6(1) (1989) allows the executive director, with the 
approval of the Securities Advisory Board# to suspend broker-dealer 
or agent licenses. Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-18.6 (1989) 
says that the Division will comply with the Administrative 
Procedures Act in its adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code 
Annotated section 63-46b-3 (1989) establishes the procedure for 
commencing administrative proceedings under the Administrative 
Procedures Act. Notices of Agency Action were served on the 
Johnsons in accordance with the requirements of section 63-46b-3. 
(R.263-295.) Those are the statutes and facts upon which subject 
matter jurisdiction is based. The claims raised by the Johnsons 
have nothing to do with the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. 
The ALJ vroverlv denied the Petitioners' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion. 
Petitioners offer a quiver-full of constitutional arguments in 
matter jurisdiction in the federal court. The court rejected that 
argument, informing the defendant that the merits of the claim were 
properly raised in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) and not in a claim that the court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
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Point 4 of their brief, which claims that Judge Eklund erred in 
denying their Rule 12(b)(6) Motion. Most of the claims of 
constitutional error raised in that section are redundant, 
unsupported with any authority and just plain a waste of this 
Court's time and the Petitioners' paper. That having been said, 
the Respondents address the issues raised in Point 4 of 
Petitioners' brief as follows. The equal protection and due 
process arguments raised in Points 4(A) and (B) will be addressed 
in Point IV of this brief. The comity argument raised in Point 
4(D) of Petitioners' brief has been addressed in Point II of this 
brief, supra. The arguments raised in Points 4(H) and (K) of 
Petitioners' brief have been addressed in Section I of this brief, 
supra. The substance of the arguments raised in Points 4(1), (J), 
and (L) will be addressed in Point IV of this brief, brief. 
The remaining issues raised in Point 4 will be addressed here. 
Those issues concern whether the Division's actions: deprived the 
Johnsons of their "privileges and immunities," Point 4(C); made the 
statute an ex post facto law, Point 4(E); interfered with the 
Johnsons' right to contract, Point 4(F); or were based on an 
unconstitutionally vague statute, Point 4(6). Respondents contend 
that this Court should not even consider any of these issues, 
however, because the Johnsons have failed to make legally 
sufficient arguments, including citations to relevant authorities, 
on each point. Instead, the Petitioners' Brief simply raises bald 
and cursory allegations. Since the Petitioners' Brief does not 
meet the standard required under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, this Court should summarily reject each of the 
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Johnsons' arguments cited at the outset of this paragraph. See, 
State v. Reiners, 151 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 22-23 n.2 (Utah App. Dec. 
28, 1990); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). That 
said, the Respondents offer the following analysis on each point. 
Petitioners have not had their privileges and immunities violated. 
In so far as Respondents can fairly discern it, Petitioners' 
argument in Point 4(C) of their brief is that by suspending their 
licenses, the Division violated their rights as federal citizens. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United State's Constitution 
states: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." 
That language has been given its clear meaning: any state law 
that purports to take away an inherent right of federal citizenship 
is invalid. See, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). The 
rights inherent in federal citizenship are as follows: the right to 
pass freely from state to state; the right to petition Congress for 
the redress of grievances; the right to vote for federal officers; 
the right to be protected against violence while in the custody of 
federal marshals; the right to inform federal authorities of 
violations of law; and the statutory right to hold property. See 
Id., at 97; Ovama v. California. 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
Of course, since Johnson-Bowles is not a citizen, the 
privileges and immunities clause offers its no protection. Nor 
does it aid Marlen Johnson, since there is no inherent right to 
sell securities that attaches to federal citizenship. 
Petitioners also appear to claim that their privileges and 
immunities under Article IV, Section 2 of the United States 
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Constitution have been violated. That argument is, if such a thing 
is possible, even less meritorious than their Fourteenth Amendment 
claim. 
Article IV, Section 2 provides: "[the] Citizens of each state 
shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of Citizens 
in the several States." That language creates a concept of 
national citizenship under which a citizen of state "A" who moves 
to state MB" cannot be treated more harshly than citizens of state 
MBM in general. See, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). 
Again, the provision is entirely inapplicable to Johnson-
Bowles, a corporate person but not a citizen, and inapplicable to 
Marlen Johnson because he makes no claim even colorably close to a 
valid argument under Article IV, Section 2. 
The Order Suspending Petitioner's Licenses was not an ex post facto 
Law. 
In Point 4(E), Petitioners argue that the order suspending 
their licenses was an illegal ex post facto law under Article I, 
section 10 of the United States Constitution. Again, Petitioners 
reveal a lack of even a basic familiarity with Constitutional 
concepts. 
First, the prohibition against ex post facto laws applies only 
to the imposition of criminal penalties. See, Calder v.Bull. 3 
U.S. 386 (1798) (ex post facto law prohibition inapplicable to 
legislative act setting aside probate order); Galvan v. Press. 347 
U.S. 522 (1954) (ex post facto prohibition has no application in 
deportation proceedings since they are civil); Garrett Freight 
Lines, Inc v. State Tax Commission, 135 P.2d 523 (Utah 1943) 
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(neither Utah nor Federal Constitutions' prohibition against ex 
post facto laws prohibited after the fact taxation of lawful 
business activity). 
Moreover, even if the Johnsons had a liberty rather than a 
property interest suspended by the Division, there still would have 
been no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 
The Division suspended the Johnsons' licenses because they 
committed a dishonest and unethical practice when they bought stock 
in violation of a stop trading order. Since it was illegal to 
participate in dishonest or unethical practices and to trade in the 
face of a stop trading order before Johnsons undertook to sell the 
U.S.A. Medical shares short, and before they bought the stock in 
violation of the order, their claim that they were the victims of 
an ex post facto law is simply silly. 
Petitioners' right to freedom from interference with contract was 
not violated. 
Since the Petitioners have not favored the Respondents or this 
Court with any analysis or authority on Point 4(F) of their brief, 
it is difficult to discern their argument on the point, let alone 
refute it. It appears to the Respondents that the Petitioners are 
claiming that they had a constitutional right to sell U.S.A. 
Medical stock after the Division placed a stop trading order on it 
because they had sold the shares short prior to the stop trading 
order being entered. 
That argument is frivolous. The freedom from interference to 
contract guaranteed by Article 1, Section 18 of the Utah 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the United States 
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Constitution does not deprive state administrative agencies of the 
right to use the state's police power to regulate business. See, 
United States Smelting v. Utah Power and Light Company, 197 P. 902 
(Utah 1921) (regulation of the rates charged by a utility company 
permissible even it interferes with contract rights). 
There was nothing vague about the Division's Command that 
Petitioners Not Trade shares covered by a stop trading order. 
In reading Petitioners' argument in Point 4 (G) of their brief 
it is easy to loose sight of what Petitioners did to warrant the 
suspension of their licenses. Petitioners had their licenses 
suspended because, after they successfully convinced a federal 
court judge that it was illegal to trade in shares of U.S.A. 
Medical (on the theory that they were unregistered securities and 
fraudulently issued) and after the Division had entered an order to 
the same effect, and after the price of the securities had 
plummeted, they purchased over 300,000 U.S.A. Medical shares. 
Petitioners now come before this Court with straight faces and 
assert that Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-6(1)(g) (1989), the 
section that allows the Division to suspend the licenses of agents 
and brokers who participate in "dishonest or unethical practices," 
and the rules promulgated thereunder, are unconstitutionally vague 
as applied to them. In their brief, Petitioners assert that the 
standard under which the statute should be measured is one of 
whether a "reasonably intelligent person" would have been able to 
discern that his conduct was dishonest or unethical. Petitioners' 
Brief, at 48. That is not the correct standard. In Brewster v. 
Maryland Securities Commissioner, 548 A,2d 157 (Md. App. 1988), a 
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case the Petitioners have tried in vain to distinguish, the court 
held that in deciding whether the phrase Hdishonest and unethical 
practices" was unconstitutionally vague, the phrase's reference in 
business practice, custom and usage must be considered. Id. at 160. 
The record in this case fully establishes that all reasonable 
people in the securities industry knew that the Division's Order 
was a total prohibition on the trading of U.S.A. Medical stock and 
that violating it could result in a license suspension. Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, at R.1136-1137 ("The proper 
scope and operative effect of the March 1, 1989 Order entered by 
the Division was to prohibit any trading of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation Securities within this state"). That being the case, 
there was nothing vague about the Division's interpretation that 
Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-6(1) (g) (1989) prohibits violating 
stop trading orders as an unethical or dishonest practice. 
Moreover, even if the vagueness test is applied using a 
reasonable person rather that a reasonable securities broker 
standard, there is still nothing vague about the statute and rules 
as applied to the Johnsons by the Division. The Johnsons knew that 
the stock in U.S.A. Medical was not exempt from registration and 
indeed successfully convinced Judge Greene of the same. Hence they 
knew that neither they nor any one else should be trading in it. 
If that were not enough, the Petitioners were specifically told by 
the Division's order that they were forbidden to trade in it. It 
does not take a person of any more than average ability to discern 
that trading in the stock under those conditions would be deemed a 
dishonest or unethical thing to do. 
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The ALJ vroperlv denied the Petitioners' Rule 56 Motion. 
The Johnsons filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That motion was 
denied, and the Johnsons claim that the denial was error. 
The Johnsons complain that the only facts asserted to be in 
dispute went to the question of "solicitation," which is immaterial 
to the case, and they further complain that the issue of 
"solicitation" was not raised by competent affidavit, as required 
under Rule 56.31 
Rule 56 allows for summary judgment in cases where two 
criterion are met: First, that there are no disputed issues of 
material fact; and, second, that the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. See, Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Insurance Co.. 
714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986); Snvder v. Merklev, 693 P.2d 64 (Utah 
1984).32 The Johnsons' motion failed to meet either criterion. 
As the rest of this brief amply demonstrates, the Johnsons were not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Further, the key issue in 
the case, whether the purchases by the Johnsons of U.S.A. Medical 
31The Division's memorandum opposing the summary judgment 
motion contained evidence of solicitation in the form of an 
affidavit by Dorothy Akin, an investigator for the Division, and in 
the form of her memorandum to the file. Admittedly, the affidavit 
is based on hearsay, and the memorandum is hearsay, but hearsay is 
allowed in formal administrative proceedings and should therefore 
by allowed in summary judgment motions. See, Utah Code Ann. S 63-
46b-8(l)(c) (1989). 
32Summary judgment should only be granted when it is clear from 
the undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot prevail. 
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates. 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 
1987); Brav Lines v. Utah Carriers Inc.. 739 P.2d 1115 (Utah App. 
1987). 
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stock after the Division imposed its Stop Trading Order constituted 
"dishonest or unethical conduct" was certainly not undisputed. 
Thus, the ALJ acted correctly in denying the Johnsons' motion for 
summary judgment. 
The Petitioners' remaining procedural objections are either frivolous or moot. 
The Johnsons assert in point 3 of the Petitioners' Brief that 
then Division Director John Baldwin's Order on Agency Review of 
October 30, 1989, with regard to Judge Eklund's order denying the 
Johnsons' motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(1) was erroneous and 
prejudicial. This was the central issue in the case of Johnson-
Bowles Company v. Baldwin, No. 900210-CA (Utah App. January 29, 
1991). The Court held that the issue was moot, and the Court 
specifically denied the Johnsons' motion to consolidate that case 
with the case currently before the Court. Therefore, this issue 
has been resolved and no longer needs addressed. 
The Johnsons claim, in point 6 of the Petitioners' Brief, that 
then Division Director John Baldwin erred in issuing his Order on 
Agency Review of April 9, 1990. That order denied further agency 
review of the Johnsons' Rule 56 Motion on the grounds that denial 
of that motion did not constitute a final agency action. Even if 
the Johnsons are right, and Director Baldwin should have allowed 
further agency review at the time, the issue is now moot. The 
Johnsons received a full agency review by Executive Director David 
L. Buhler of the Department of Commerce after the Division of 
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Securities entered its final order, R.1129-1142. The Department of 
Commerce then issued a detailed Order on Review, R.830-842, which 
specifically reviewed the denial of the Johnsons' Rule 56 motion. 
See, R.840-841. Thus, the Johnsons' received the agency review 
that they sought, and this issue is moot on appeal. 
Point 8 of the Petitioners' Brief alleges error because the 
Division ignored both the Johnsons' objection to the form and 
content of the Divisions' final order, and the Johnsons' "Demand 
for Disclosure of how and by whom the August 13, 1990, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was Prepared.33" The Division 
rightly ignored both motions, which are nothing more than a 
spurious and frivolous attack on the integrity of the Security 
Advisory Board and Judge Eklund.34 Further, the Johnsons waived 
their objections when they failed to raise them at the agency 
review before the Department of Commerce. Their request for review 
does not include a request for review of the Division's failure to 
act on either order. The Department of Commerce even invited the 
330f course, no such motion has ever been recognized tinder the 
laws of this state or, to the best of counsel's knowledge, under 
the laws of any state. It is not provided for in any rule, and 
while courts have the right, in the furtherance of justice, to 
entertain a wide range of motions not specifically provided for by 
rule, there is no authority for requiring a court to entertain such 
dross as this. 
34Assuming, arguendo, that people other than the Securities 
Advisory Board, Judge Eklund, and former Director Baldwin were 
involved in the process of drafting the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order (an assumption that is entirely 
lacking in evidence, since the document may very well have been 
drafted by a member of the Securities Advisory Board on a word 
processor different from the one usually used by Judge Eklund), 
that does not change the fact that the members of the Securities 
Advisory Board, and Mr. Baldwin, approved the wording of the 
document and signed their names to it. 
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Johnsons to supplement their request for review, but the Johnsons 
"declined the invitation and filed no more memoranda.- Department 
of Commerce Order on Review, R.832. 
Point 9 of the Petitioners' Brief alleges that the Department 
of Commerce's Order on Review is flawed simply because it failed to 
overturn the final order of the Division of Securities. This 
argument adds nothing to the case; either the Division's final 
order was correct, in which case so was the Order on Review, or it 
was flawed, in which case so was the Order on Review. There is no 
independent error claimed on the part of Executive Director Buhler, 
the author of the Order on Review. 
Point IV; The Divisions' U.S.A. Medical Stop Tradina Order was 
valid at the time when the Petitioners purchased U.S.A. Medical 
stock; 
This Court should not even consider challenges to the validity 
of The Division's Stop Trading Order. The order was entered in 
large part as a result of prompting by the Johnsons and because of 
the Johnsons' evidence, put on in the Johnsons' Federal Lawsuit, 
that U.S.A. Medical stock lacked trading exemptions and was 
fraudulently issued. The Johnsons received a copy of the Divisions 
summary stop order as soon as it was entered, and that copy stated 
that "notice is hereby given that within fifteen (15) days after 
receipt of a written request, this matter will be set down for 
hearing." R.294. Not surprisingly, the Johnsons, who were 
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benefiting from the stop trading order's existence,35 did not 
request a hearing. When no hearing was requested, under the terms 
of Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14(3) (1989) "the order will 
remain in effect until it is modified or vacated by the executive 
director." The Division then issued its default (permanent) 
version of the Stop Trading Order, and the Johnsons were again 
immediately provided with a copy. Again not surprisingly, the 
Johnsons did not take any action to try to lift the Stop Trading 
Order. Because the Johnsons were the parties who worked hard to 
get the Stop Trading Order issued, and because they were routinely 
admitting in both court and correspondence throughout the months of 
February and March of 1989 that the U.S.A. Medical stock lacked all 
exemptions and could not be legally traded, they should be 
estopped from attacking the validity of the order. Further, they 
waived their right to complain about the validity of the order when 
they failed to request a hearing, and again when they took no 
actions, not even a letter of protest, when notified that the order 
had become permanent by default. 
The Johnsons argue that, at most, the Division's stop trading 
order could only have been valid for ten days, from March 1, 1989, 
through March 10, 1989, and therefore, purchases of stock made by 
them after March 10th could not have violated the order, or 
constituted dishonest or unethical behavior on their part. Of 
course, that argument is only relevant if the Johnsons can show 
35Without the stop trading order it is highly improbable that 
the price of U.S.A. Medical stock would have fallen to a fraction 
of its pre-order value, thereby making it attractive for the 
Johnsons to buy the stock. 
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that all of their purchases took place after March 10th; if even 
one purchase took place on or before that date, that purchase would 
have been a sufficient basis for the Division's order*36 The 
evidence, however, merely shows that all of the purchases took 
place during March of 1989; there is no evidence as to the exact 
dates in March. It is therefore reasonable to assume that some of 
the purchases may have taken place on or before March 10th. 
Because the Johnsons have utterly failed to meet their burden of 
introducing evidence that all of their purchases were begun and 
completed after March 10th, this court should not even consider the 
issue of whether the Division's Stop Trading Order could lawfully 
last more than ten days. 
Turning to the substance of the Johnsons' argument, it is 
clear that they have confused two types of stop trading orders, 
namely the ten day "suspension of trading" type of order and the 
potentially permanent "denial of exemption from registration" type 
of order. 
The SEC can issue a "suspension of trading" type of stop 
trading order under the authority of Section 12(k) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. S 781(k), which reads 
in part as follows: 
If in its opinion the public interest and the protection 
of investors so require, the Commission is authorized 
summarily to suspend trading in any security (other than 
an exempted security) for a period not exceeding ten 
days, or with the approval of the President, summarily to 
36Actually, the S.E.C.'s suspension order expired on March 16, 
1989. Since it would obviously have been dishonest or unethical to 
violate that order, the Johnsons' must show that all of their 
purchases took place after March 16th. 
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suspend all trading on any national securities exchange 
or otherwise, in securities other than exempted 
securities, for a period not exceeding ninety days. 
This suspension of trading type of stop trading order has several 
unique characteristics, the most noteworthy of which is that it may 
be entered by the SEC any time that "the public interest and the 
protection of investors so require.H Thus it may be used in an 
almost unlimited variety of circumstances. For example, if the 
president and guiding force of a high-tech company suddenly dies, 
the SEC could use its power to suspend trading and give the market 
some cooling off time in order to prevent wild price instability. 
Because the SEC's authority under this provision is so broad, and 
essentially unreviewable, it is limited to ten days (or ninety, 
with the President's concurrence). 
By contrast, SEC Rule 261, Suspension of Exemption, under the 
Securities Act of 1933, 17 CFR S 230.261 (1990) provides for 
potentially permanent stop trading orders based upon the suspension 
of exemptions from registration requirements. It operates in much 
the same manner as Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14 (1989), 
which is the section relied upon by the Division in this case.37 
Each provision operates to stop trading in a stock by denying the 
availability of exemptions to the stock registration requirements. 
Under each provision the order is originally temporary, but becomes 
37Rule 261 is very similar to the other stop order provision 
in the Utah Uniform Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-12 
(1989). The primary difference between sections 61-1-12 and 61-1-
14(3), is that the former section is limited to denying the 
effectiveness of registration statements, while the latter section 
is used for stop trading orders based upon the denial of exemptions 
from registration. 
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permanent if no hearing is requested within a set period of time. 
See, Rule 261(b) (MIf no hearing is requested . . . the order shall 
become permanent on the thirtieth day after it entry and shall 
remain in effect unless or until it is modified or vacated by the 
Commission.H) 
Thus, under a provision that is extremely similar to the 
provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, the SEC does have 
authority to stop trading in a stock permanently. Obviously, Utah 
Code Annotated section 61-1-14(3) does not conflict with the 
federal law, and the Petitioners' claim that the Stop Trading Order 
could not lawfully last for more than ten days is meritless.38 
Point V: The Divisions' Order Suspending the Johnsons1 
Registration with the Division for One Year and Placing the 
Johnsons' on Probation for Two Years Thereafter was Reasonable in 
Light of the Severity and Willful Nature of the Johnsons' Conduct: 
The facts of this case, and the analysis contained in the 
prior portions of this brief, should be sufficient to establish 
38So is the related argument that a permanent stop trading 
order constitutes an unlawful taking of property, an argument that 
should be rejected out of hand because the Petitioners have failed 
to support it with any authority or more than the most general 
argument. State v. Reiners, 151 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 22-23 n.2 (Utah 
App. Dec. 28 1990); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 
1989). Of course, under a stop trading order there is only a 
suspension of the right to trade the stock, not a "taking" of the 
right to own the stock (and to receive dividends, vote at 
shareholders' meetings, etc.). Further, the Johnsons waived their 
right to object to the propriety of the alleged taking when they 
failed to request a hearing. Finally, even a permanent stop 
trading order is subject to modification or vacation, something 
that the Johnsons have never sought in this case. See, Utah Code 
Ann. S 61-1-14(3) (1989). 
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that the Division did not abuse its discretion in placing the 
Johnsons on one year's suspension followed by two year's probation. 
The Johnsons' behavior constituted as direct and willful a 
violation of a Division order as can be imagined. Not only did the 
Johnsons know about the order, they were largely responsible for 
its issuance. They also profited handsomely from violating the 
order, to the tune of more than $500,000. As the Securities 
Advisory Board and John Baldwin put it in the Divisions' 
Conclusions of Law: 
[E]ntry of a disciplinary sanction in this proceeding is 
in the public interest and clearly warranted due to [the 
Johnsons'] non-compliance with the March 1, 1989 Order 
which was duly entered to regulate the trading of U.S.A. 
Medical Corporation Securities. The record reflects that 
Respondents' dishonest and unethical conduct was driven 
by a desire to realize monetary gain and/or avoid 
financial loss and that [the Johnsons'] willingness to 
engage in trading the securities shifted over time, 
depending upon whatever would promote [their] economic 
interests. Adherence to orders duly entered by the 
Division which govern the practices of broker-dealers and 
against engaged in the securities business should not be 
a matter dictated by the potential for monetary gain. By 
reason of the serious nature of [ the Johnsons'] 
misconduct, an appropriately severe sanction should be 
entered. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, at R.1139-1140. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the penalty meted out was not 
an abuse of discretion by the Division.39 
39Likewise, the Johnson's claim that the Division's actions 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, section 1, is baseless. That 
argument, which like so many others cites no legal authority (and 
should therefore be summarily dismissed) is premised on the belief 
that the Division singled out the Johnsons for punishment. In 
fact, two of the masterminds behind U.S.A. Medical, Jim Averett and 
Roger Coleman have pled guilty to related crimes (Averett received 
probation; Coleman will be sentenced soon, and prison time is 
expected). Paul Jones is still facing disciplinary action (the 
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CONCLUSIONS THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD AFFIRM THE RESPONDENTS' 
ACTIONS IN ALL REGARDS: 
Under the facts of this case, looking at the record as a 
whole, the Division acted reasonably and rationally in suspending 
the licenses of Johnson-Bowles and Marlen Johnson for one year and 
placing them on a two year suspension. This Court should uphold 
the Division's actions. 
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only reason his case has been inactive so long is the lack of 
resources to pursue it, caused largely by the many frivolous 
motions and grounds for appeal raised by the Johnsons). As for the 
parties that transacted trades in U.S.A. Medical on March 1, 1989, 
there is no clear evidence that they knew of the Division's order 
before they executed their trades. Of course, the Johnsons were 
unique in that they originally urged the Division to issue the Stop 
Trading Order, and then proceeded to violate that order once the 
price of U.S.A. Medical stock had fallen dramatically. 
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